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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this paper is upon how people handle the sharing of personal data as an interactional 
concern. A number of ethnographic studies of domestic environments are drawn upon in order to 
articulate a range of circumstances under which data may be shared. In particular a distinction is 
made between the in situ sharing of data with others around you and the sharing of data with remote 
parties online. A distinction is also drawn between circumstances of purposefully sharing data in 
some way and circumstances where the sharing of data is incidental or even unwitting. On the basis 
of these studies a number of the organisational features of how people seek to manage the ways in 
which their data is shared are teased out. The paper then reflects upon how data sharing practices 
have evolved to handle the increasing presence of digital systems in people’s environments and how 
these relate to the ways in which people traditionally orient to the sharing of information. In 
conclusion a number of ways are pointed out in which the sharing of data remains problematic and 
there is a discussion of how systems may need to adapt to better support people’s data sharing 
practices in the future.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The past few decades have seen a spread of digital technologies throughout our lived environments 
with an increasing trend towards networking those technologies such that they can interact with not 
just the people immediately around them but the outside world as well. Thus we now inhabit a world 
where increasingly large amounts of information about us, or others we know, is shared through the 
use of computing systems. Sometimes the process of sharing is deliberate, sometimes it is not. 
Sometimes the people with whom we share information are known to us, sometimes they are not. 
Nonetheless, across and within these systems and networks transactions are going on. ‘Data’1 is 
being moved between parties and that movement is somehow being managed, either by people 
themselves or by the systems that are handling the collection and movement of the data. So, as 
computing systems become an ever-more pervasive feature of our lives and are increasingly 
embedded in our environments through enabling platforms such as the Internet of Things, we are 
beginning to have to come to terms with new ways in which information relating to us might be 
shared or can be managed and accounted for. This has led to increasingly widespread and vocal 
debates regarding the implications of all of this for topics such as privacy and data confidentiality. 
The focus of this paper in that case is upon what happens when personal information is shared via 
digital means or the sharing of it is implicated by the presence of digital data of some kind. Some 
of this data is utterly familiar to us: it is text, or photos, or videos, etc. However, some of it is less 
familiar. It may concern data collected from sensors, distributed throughout households and 
embedded in everyday objects, such as is envisioned in many of the scenarios glossed under the 
notion of the Internet of Things. It may relate to ensembles of sensor data, location data and 
applications such as can be found in many of the health applications people use to undertake routine 
monitoring of health and fitness. It may relate to data collected about people’s online activities, the 
sites they visit, with what frequency, when and where they go there, what they actually do when 
they are connected to a network. It may also relate to the traces left by people in the digital world as 
they interact with and pass through a variety of third party systems, at work, when travelling, when 
shopping, when undertaking cultural activities, and so on. 
These digital transactions place new demands on our interactional competence. Somehow or 
other we are having to arrive at ways in which to manage and deal with the outcomes of this ongoing 
dispersal of information by digital means. At the same time, however, it is not as if these 
competences have arisen from nowhere. On the contrary, people have been sharing information with 
one another for countless eons and have a fine-tuned body of practices – what might be termed a 
‘practical politics’2 – around which this sharing is articulated. It is against this backdrop of existing 
competence that a practical politics of sharing data is formulated. As one might expect of an arising 
body of reasoning, it is sometimes found wanting. But it is also rapidly evolving into a presumptive 
resource around which other kinds of action can be organised.  
This paper makes use of a number of recent ethnographic studies of ordinary everyday life to 
examine what this practical politics of sharing data looks like. In particular it is going to look at 
some of the key organisational features of that politics: how data gets shared with others around us 
in our physical environment, both purposefully and incidentally; how it gets shared with remote 
parties, both known and unknown, through online interaction; how the sharing gets managed across 
all of these different situations; and how sharing practices are oriented to, reasoned about, and 
accounted for as a methodical body of practice. Along the way we shall be considering how these 
practices relate to how people orient to the sharing of information more broadly and accentuating 
the ways in which these orientations can lead to trouble when it is digital data that is being shared. 
Something that will be highlighted in particular is the way in which the sharing of data can breach 
 
1 What the Oxford English Dictionary defines as “The quantities, characters, or symbols on which operations are 
performed by a computer, which may be stored and transmitted in the form of electrical signals and recorded on magnetic, 
optical or mechanical recording media.” (see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/data) 
2 The coinage of this term relates to its Greek origins and the works of Plato and Aristotle where it is associated with the 
active pursuit of policies to facilitate the governance of specific communities and the associated accountabilities of the 
governors and the governed. Here we are interested in how those policies are produced and made visible through the 
conduct of our everyday affairs, and how they are practically managed in our ongoing interactions with, and our 
accountability to specific cohorts of people. 
The Practical Politics of Sharing Personal Data                                      
3  
                                                                                                                                         
 
 
our ordinary understandings of who might have access to information about us, with concomitant 
implications for how information might get premised and accounted for. 
In the last few sections of the paper we shall be considering some of the specific lessons to be 
drawn for design out of all of this and the ways in which these lessons overturn some of the standard 
assumptions regarding the design of systems that might support the preservation of privacy. In 
conclusion we will briefly consider what future design might need to take on board to be able to 
effectively complement an already growing body of practice. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The debates regarding the sharing of personal information and personal data have grown ever more 
vocal as computer systems have continued to extend their reach into the increasingly intimate 
aspects of people’s lives. As a consequence the HCI literature relating to this (and the broader topic 
of privacy) is already vast. The following paragraphs provide a brief summary of the key 
perspectives that have been adopted thus far and some pointers to the primary publications. 
Nonetheless it should be understood that any such exercise is going to be necessarily partial and not 
open to being addressed properly in anything less than a full survey paper. In the discussion of the 
ethnographic data a number of texts will be mentioned that are more specifically related to the 
argument being made here. 
2.1 Perspectives on the Sharing of Personal Data 
2.1.1. The notion of personal data itself.  
To start at the beginning, so to speak, one of the central topics addressed within the literature is what 
might count as personal data in the first place and then how it might be collected and handled. In 
relation to this a good many papers seek to somehow define personal data and its compass. So some 
authors draw a distinction between data that people may create themselves (e.g. emails, media, 
documents, etc.) and data that is created about them through the use of system logging or 
environmental monitoring (the role of sharing with regard to this latter point is something we shall 
be returning to later in this paper) [10][67]. A closely related perspective discusses distinctions 
between data that people may ‘volunteer’ to share themselves, for instance through personal profiles, 
applications, preferences, and posted content such as one finds on social media, and data that is 
surrendered to others on their behalf by human or machine-based agents 
[2][12][26][27][53][56][69][77]. In this vein one can also encounter a distinction being drawn 
between data that is actively recorded in some way and data that is simply monitored in an ongoing 
fashion by an infrastructure, such as lifelogging, location, or other kinds of digital traces [5][13][14]. 
Discussions that move beyond the point at which personal data is somehow shared and gathered 
may also look to the arrangements whereby the data is stored and how provision is made for its 
management and retrieval [14][43][67]. This is where concerns about security may also often kick 
in [3][4][8]. Implicit in discussions about storage are concerns about the mechanisms whereby 
personal data is collected in the first place and then moved to a point of storage and access. There 
is a weighty literature bound up with these concerns and the troubles caused by the sheer diversity 
and potentially distributed character of personal data, not to mention how provision may be built in 
to cover management and control of how the data is accessed, and even how ownership of personal 
data my be best defined [45][54][70].  A consideration underlying all of these perspectives that has 
long been generative of debate is the question of what might count as being ‘personal’ in the first 
place. Often there are attempts to treat what might be considered as being personal or sensitive as 
something relatively fixed [1][3], and there are a number of taxonomies and ontologies to be found 
in this regard [65]. But there are others who seek to challenge this view, arguing that potential 
sensitivity is often not considered at all [28][50] or is situationally-bound [46][54][69]. 
2.1.2. Methods of sharing personal data.  
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Another key focus in the literature that is especially pertinent for our own interests here is the ways 
in which personal data may be shared. Technical concerns here often centre upon the ways in which 
personal data might be rendered, organised, and visualized such that others may make use of it in 
some way [12][34][49][73]. Discussion here has also focused upon the extent to which data and data 
visualizations are intelligible at first encounter and how, as a consequence, people may interact with 
data [55]. It is noticeable that this is the least heavily populated perspective in the literature, adding 
to the need for the kind of endeavour being pursued in this paper. 
2.1.3. Reasons for sharing personal data.  
Looking beyond just the initial presentation of personal data there is also an interest in the literature 
regarding the underlying reasons people may have for sharing their personal data (both positive and 
negative), covering a loose assembly of topics such as the forging and preservation of social links 
[13][15][39], engendering kudos [22][26], managing identity [48][80], impression management [11], 
self-display [48], creating ‘social capital’ [26][39], maintaining trust [25][37], to preserve memories 
and encourage recollection [68], or even in order to facilitate various kinds of transactions, both 
commercial and non-commercial [24][37][53][61], and to support the provision of certain kinds of 
services such as healthcare [7][15]. 
2.1.4. The use of personal data and associated threats.  
Moving on down the line from collection, comprehension, and purpose, there is an interest in how 
personal data may then be used by other parties, the extent to which this may constitute some kind 
of threat, and concomitant interests in therefore offsetting risks of inappropriate use. A lot of 
literature here centres upon how personal data may be used to inform things such as advertising 
[35][58], service development [15][30][74], product development, or direct marketing [57]. There 
is also some interest in how it may be used to support the identification of potential recipients of 
advice or instruction [42]. On the back of this come debates about the ways in which use may actual 
constitute misuse. The literature here is simply huge, encompassing both quite discrete topics such 
as the notion of attack surfaces [[9][76], and much broader ones such as privacy 
[6][7][8][10][13][25][30][50][51][62][69][77], consent [10][52][73], or the defamation of identity 
[27][48][51]. The latter may also be seen to encompass matters such as the use of personal data for 
the purposes of shame and ridicule, exposure, retribution, bullying, and even blackmail [32][46][69]. 
A deeper concern here is the extent to which people are aware of the fact their data is being used in 
the first place [2][5][26][33][36]. A common counterpart to discussions about privacy is once again 
security, this time with regard to the ways in which personal data may be revealed [16][71]. A further 
topic that may also be seen to be related to the preceding issues is that of onward disclosure of 
acquired personal data, including what might or might not be covered by legislation such as the 
UK’s Data Protection Act [10][27][62][66].  
2.2 Respecifying the interest 
Whilst the above materials already constitute a rich resource across a range of topics related to the 
sharing of personal information, this paper is seeking to take a somewhat different tack. Instead of 
taking the sharing of personal data as a given and seeking to explore the implications of that, it takes 
as its first order of business an investigation of how the sharing of personal data is itself 
accomplished as a practical feature of everyday life. In other words instead of the broad-brush 
discussions of what is ‘private’ or ‘personal’ that typically pervade the ‘privacy’ literature, even in 
HCI, we concentrate entirely here on what notions such as ‘private’ or ‘personal’ might amount to 
as interactionally established matters. Whilst not dismissing the need for a range of perspectives to 
be adopted regarding privacy-related topics, in this paper we take the view that how privacy works 
as a feature of actual situated interaction is a preliminary consideration and that it is hard to fully 
unpack other matters if you don’t have a grasp of what things like the sharing of personal data itself 
looks like in practice. As will be seen in all that follows, it is a multifaceted affair, with numerous 
subtle nuances that even here can only be dipped into rather than covered in comprehensive detail. 
However, it is also clear that a number of the findings outlined above make greater sense once one 
understands the practices underlying them. This paper is therefore not so much seeking to overturn 
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the edifice of existing literature on this topic as to set it on a sounder footing by articulating the 
interactional dynamics upon which many of the phenomena described are founded. 
It should also be noted that this paper is a companion piece to a number of other articles that 
have been published in recent years. One such article examines the social and relational aspects of 
how people interact with data, with a special eye to how personal data may get articulated [18]. 
Another looks at how people work with, render intelligible, and account for sensor traces of their 
own activity [75]. Crabtree and Mortier [19] examine how the processing of personal data in the 
context of the Internet of Things may be resulting in a shift in where matters such as agency and 
control may be said to operate and, in a related paper, Crabtree et al [20] look at how new 
developments in how personal data may be managed could be giving rise to a ‘new economic actor’. 
More recent papers still in the process of publication have looked at how people go about managing 
digital privacy in practice [21] and how digital technology may be bringing about new forms of 
observability and concomitant accountability in domestic environments [31]. It will also be seen 
that this paper builds upon an earlier paper regarding how people collaboratively work up and draw 
upon policies regarding the use of their home networks [17]. Where this paper sits in relation to all 
of these other publications is in providing a study of some of the interactional ‘glue’ that these 
various other considerations turn upon. 
3. A ‘DEFENSIVELY DESIGNED STORY’ 
As a preliminary to looking at the ethnographic work we are going to take a brief look here at a 
classic text by Harvey Sacks dating from the early 1970s. What the text demonstrates is the amount 
of subtlety and sophistication involved in sharing personal information with other people regarding 
the relationship that exists between the parties, their respective accountabilities and potential rights 
and obligations, and the role that sharing information can play in reflexively shaping how those 
rights and obligations might pan out in the future. Here is the short snippet of interaction that Sacks 
was working with: 
Louise: One night- (1.0) I was with this guy that I liked a real lot. An’ uh (3.0) we had come back from the 
show, we had gone to the (1.0) Ash Grove for a while, ‘n we were gonna park. An’ I can’t stand a 
car. ‘n he // has a small car.             
Ken:     Mm hm, 
Louise: So we walked to the back, an’ we just wen’ into the back House an’ we stayed there half the night. 
(1.0) We didn’t go to bed to- t’each other, but- it was so comfortable an’ so // nice. 
Ken:      Mm hm, 
Ken:      Mh 
Louise:  Y’know? There’s everything perfect. 
[64] 
In his discussion of this story Sacks points to a number of features that lead to him describing it as 
what he calls a ‘defensively designed’ story. Clearly the account provided in this story is 
recognizably personal in its character and what Sacks is keen to point out is that a) this kind of story 
cannot just be told to anyone in any circumstance, and b) the exact way it is worked up is very tightly 
managed with regard to just whom it is being told to. The general term Sacks uses for such particular 
presentations of talk is ‘recipient design’, but recipient design can gloss a wide range of quite distinct 
phenomena so just saying the story is recipient designed is not enough. The question is just how it’s 
recipient designed and just what kind of work that design is doing.  
The background Sacks provides regarding this story is that the talk is currently about ‘variant 
places for sex’ and is being told to an unmarried male colleague. The latter fact is something Sacks 
focuses on in particular because his argument is that the story is defensively designed because the 
recipient is male, of a similar age, and unmarried. So a risk here is that the recipient might think that 
she is telling him about her availability. Sacks suggests that, this being the case, there are features 
within the telling that make it clear to Ken that, because this happened in the past, it cannot be safely 
read as saying anything much about what she might be willing to do now. He also points to how the 
use of tense within the story and the positioning of what might be referring to sex within it quite 
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carefully situates the sex as being a normal and expectable occurrence that just anyone of a similar 
age and circumstance to her might recognize. At the same time, because the talk here is about variant 
places for having sex, the story works to make this a recognizable variant in that the usual place for 
teenagers to have sex is in their cars, and so she has to make the rejection of that possibility visible. 
But having made that difference visible she also quite carefully says what she didn’t do so that the 
recipient can’t take it to signify much. And, as Sacks points out, she would not necessarily have 
seen this kind of organization of the story as being necessary had she been telling it to a girlfriend 
instead. 
So what we can see here is that whilst people will find occasion to reveal to others really quite 
intimate details about their lives, they exercise very tight control, through the mechanics of just how 
those details are revealed, over just what may be made of those details – just what use may be made 
of the information that is being shared. As Sacks observes: 
“… in that she’s telling a rather dangerous story, its size has to do with the 
warding off of inferences that could be made from the specific event that she 
intends to tell of” [64: Vol II, 457]. 
He further observes – and this is critical for our interests here: 
 “And one can see that, as complicated as it turns out to be to tell this story to 
even a colleague, what a job is involved if one is trying to tell it to someone who 
isn’t. She couldn’t, then, use the positioning, place, etc., the sense of “half the 
night,” in order to bring off precisely what she’s bringing off and defending 
against” [ibid]. 
It’s worth pointing out that it is also the case here that Louise’s account provides for ways in which 
Ken might be called to account for handling the information it reveals. It is not as if Ken has received 
on his computer a video recording of the possible sexual encounter Louise has been telling him 
about and now has to work out what he might or might not do with that information or what it might 
tell him about her sexual availability. Her account quite neatly ties up such matters and, to all intents 
and purposes, tells him how he might proceed. 
The purpose of presenting the above material is to bring to the fore the point that all witting 
information sharing is somehow recipient designed. This is not our discovery, of course, and the 
mechanics of this were best elaborated by Sacks in this account. The ‘defensive’ character of the 
story here also serves to underscore the fact that when information is shared unwittingly it removes 
the scope to design the sharing to fit the need. This is a potential risk when sharing data and this 
paper is a working through of how the sharing of data is accomplished, how the sharing is managed 
(which reflects Sacks’s point), and how the risk is offset or, when realised, how prospective trouble 
is handled, when possible, through repair.  
4. STUDYING THE SHARING OF DATA 
This paper draws upon a collection of studies that have been undertaken over recent years and that 
have each, in some way, intercepted aspects of people’s lives that might be deemed ‘personal’ or 
‘private’. Many, though not all, have focused upon domestic environments. The studies that are 
focused upon in particular fall into two principal blocks: 1) studies of the use of wireless networks 
in the home which have examined how online activity is interleaved with, and a feature of, ordinary 
everyday life (see most notably the UK EPSRC-funded project ‘Homework’3 and the European 
Commission funded project ‘User-Centric Networking’4); 2) studies bound up with the notion of 
‘the internet of things’ that have been looking at things like the explicit use of sensors to capture 
aspects of people’s activity (see, for instance, the RCUK Digital Economy-funded project ‘The Hub 
of All Things’5) or how people interact with and account for the data arising from digital traces of 
the things they do (see, for instance, the EPSRC-funded fellowship ‘Building Accountability into 
 
3 homenetworks.ac.uk 
4 https://usercentricnetworking.eu 
5 hubofallthings.com/main/ 
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the Internet of Things’6). Together these studies amount to a substantial body of empirically gathered 
materials that span about 10 years of situated observation and all of them are replete with details of 
how people manage and share personal information and personal data as an ordinary feature of their 
everyday lives. 
All of the studies mentioned were ethnomethodological in character [29] and all of them hinged 
upon the use of ethnography. In other words they all involved situated observation of exactly how 
people accomplish their everyday affairs as they go about them. These observations are recorded in 
fine-grained detail and worked up into ‘thick descriptions’ [63] of just how specific activities are 
accomplished. The recorded elements themselves are typically assemblies of a variety of things 
including notes captured during the direct observations, audio recordings and video recordings 
captured both during the in situ accomplishment of ordinary everyday activities and during 
interviews, photographs and printed documents, and, in most cases, data extracted from computer-
based logs. The methodological aspects of these activities are then explicated to make visible their 
orderly and accountable characteristics. This approach, sometimes glossed as 
ethnomethodologically-informed ethnography [38], has become an increasingly important aspect of 
systems design and is now a recurrently visible part of the design cycle in a number of communities 
such as Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) and Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). 
More specific details of the studies will be provided in the course of presenting various examples 
so that the reader can grasp more easily the context in which the recorded phenomena were observed. 
5. THE SHARING OF PERSONAL DATA 
There is a fundamental observation to emphasise here as the backdrop to the discussion that will be 
engaged in regarding the exercise of a practical politics when sharing data. There are now numerous 
ethnomethodological studies of everyday domestic life and they all explicate in detail ways in which 
household life is socially organized and possessed of accountable characteristics towards which 
members of a household are continually oriented throughout the accomplishment of their everyday 
affairs. This social order constitutes a moral order. That is, it is an order upon which the very need 
for explicit account or otherwise is founded. It is an order that provides for seeing what needs to be 
done or left alone entirely. It is an order that provides for seeing what one’s rights and obligations 
might be and for seeing what might or might not be reasonably expected of others. As Garfinkel 
expressed the matter: 
“A society’s members encounter and know the moral order as perceivedly normal 
course of action – familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life known 
in common with others and with others taken for granted” [29: 35] 
Thus when we look at the sharing of personal data there is in the same way a locally oriented to 
moral order that provides for what accountably appropriate sharing might look like. This order is 
organized around two somewhat overlapping but largely distinct concerns: how personal data is 
being shared with others around you who also physically share the same setting; and how personal 
data is being shared with other parties whose principal source of access to it is through what is made 
visible online. The discussion here is therefore organized around these two concerns. Within them 
we shall also be looking at: just how personal data sharing is managed in everyday practice; what is 
being oriented to within those practices – the practical politics so to speak; and, in addition, the ways 
in which the current design of computing systems may result in breaches of those orientations, 
resulting in a need for some kind of repair. 
 
6 iotdatabox.com/IoT/Home.html 
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5.1 Sharing personal data with those around you 
5.1.1 Managing how the data is shared 
A great deal of what people would readily describe as the sharing of personal data is currently taking 
place within the confines of well-understood relationships and expectable cohorts of recipients. In 
the following a study participant in his early 60s who had been asked to maintain and share the 
output of various sensors in his home, describes some of the ways in which he is already routinely 
sharing his health data which is collected by a fitbit and then kept and displayed on his smartphone: 
The cycling club are very concerned with their health.  We’re cycling with a group of older people but 
they’re very fit.  But they largely have some sort of heath problem.  So there’s a great discussion, when 
we’re together, about health problems on a quite deep level because they’re interested and they know 
their bodies … For coffee, we cycle, we stop, and at those social gatherings in between we would be 
sitting round a table and say well how are you and how are you and how are you? And that’s when that 
sort of sharing takes place…to some people you might get out your phone and it becomes quite personal 
sharing … Depends who you’re talking to. 
There are a number of things to notice about this. First of all, there are appropriate places where 
such sharing of data can occur, e.g. sat around the table at the coffee shop rather than by the roadside, 
whilst cycling along, or whatever. Then there are appropriate times: whilst taking a pause when out 
cycling rather than when they first meet up and set off, for instance. It’s also clear there are 
appropriate recipients for this kind of data. They are members of the cycling club. Others amongst 
them use the same kinds of devices and keep the same kind of data. They can be presumed to be 
able to reason about the data in the same kinds of ways and to therefore have a grasp of what your 
data is saying and what might be made of it. Clearly you could not just sit down with anyone to have 
coffee and make the same kinds of assumptions. Another feature worth pointing out is the way the 
participant says: “we would be sitting round a table and say well how are you and how are you and 
how are you? And that’s when that sort of sharing takes place”. What this recognises is that sharing 
personal data in this way is something that does not happen as a matter of course. It has to be 
occasioned, for instance through enquiries into the state of people’s health. So another organisational 
feature people are oriented to here is the need to actually build the sharing of data into an ongoing 
course of interaction, using a range of mundane but recurrently visible everyday practices for doing 
that, such as topic raising. Another thing is understanding what an appropriate response to a question 
like ‘how are you?’ might look like. For many it might be something like ‘oh, alright, bit of a cough 
at the moment but nothing serious’. But here, amongst this specific cohort, another appropriate 
response can be getting out your phone and showing people specific details like your weight, your 
heart rate, your blood pressure, your BMI, your body fat percentage, and so on. So there are some 
other methodological matters involved here regarding understanding that in certain circumstances 
an appropriate response to someone asking after your health might be the actual display of personal 
data on a device.  Clearly this is not independent of a specific cohort and its interests and what is 
commonsensically known about that cohort. But it is also the case that ordinary questions are not 
typically productive of extraordinary responses, or at least not without some special kind of an 
account. So actively sharing personal data via the screen on a mobile phone can be a wholly routine 
and mundane occurrence given the right time, the right place, the right occasioning and the right 
cohort. 
It’s not that the organizational arrangements outlined above are fixed and never subject to 
variance. Of course they are, but in each case the appropriateness or otherwise of the sharing is 
commonsensically available to both the people doing the sharing and their recipients. The study 
participant here could send a screenshot of the health app on his phone to one of his cycling buddies 
whilst at work, but his cycling buddy would clearly need some further account than just the data 
itself to understand why it is he might be doing this. Similarly, the cycling buddy might just call him 
up and ask him to send him his latest data, but again the need for some further account is apparent. 
This underscores an important point about all of this straight away. It is not just that the sharing of 
personal data is open to the exercise of control by the person doing the sharing of the data. It is also 
the case that the practices of sharing across all of the dimensions mentioned and maybe more are 
ones that have to be mutually seen to be appropriate. In other words, recipients play an important 
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role in what data sharing practices look like. The practical sharing of personal data is an 
intersubjective accomplishment. 
A thing to point out about all of this is that, when it is a party to whom the personal data refers 
that is doing the sharing many aspects of how the sharing gets done are tightly aligned with the 
observations discussed earlier that were originally made by Sacks. That is: the revelation of personal 
information here is very tightly tied to the mechanics of just how that information is revealed over 
the course of situated interaction. The active sharing of personal data is shaped and adapted in 
mutually accountable ways to the specific circumstances in which it is shared, and it is through what 
is said and not said, what is shown and not shown, what time and place is chosen or not chosen, 
what potential prompt is taken up or set aside, that people exercise control over what data is shared 
and what use may be made of it. 
5.1.2 Controlling who gets to look 
A way of controlling the personal data one shares with other people in situ is to control access to 
the device on which the data may be displayed. One might give them device, and, of course, there 
are occasions when this happens, but an alternative method is to show them just exactly what you 
want to show them on the device yourself. This is clearly a part of how the sharing was being done 
in the preceding example of sharing health data amongst members of a cycling club. It also came 
up on a number of occasions during interviews with people regarding the digital privacy 
management practices. It was noted to be a particularly key strategy where people wanted to share 
very specific content but where the content was a feature of activities and repositories that were 
actively described as being ‘private’. Here a 21 year-old student is talking about how she might 
occasionally share content with others around her on Tumblr: 
Evelyn: I don’t like anybody seeing what’s going on on Tumblr. Occasionally I’ll show Susan [her 
sister] a- a picture or a gif of a cat. But I don’t- 
Fieldworker: But that’s you specifically have that image and you show it to her 
Evelyn: And show it to her, yeah 
Fieldworker: Rather than you let her watch you doing the posting 
Evelyn: Yeah 
So, as a matter of method, the sharing of personal data can be accomplished by displaying it first of 
all on some specific device and then physically taking the device to the recipient and holding it in 
such a way that the recipient can see it. There are a number of permutations whereby this can be 
brought about. It might be that the prospective recipient is an adjacent position and it is just a matter 
of locating the thing to be shared and then re-angling the device so that they can see it. It may also 
be the case that the device is not mobile, in which case sharing may involve calling the recipient 
over to the device. Locating the data may also be something that is done prior to display or once the 
recipient is actually co-present. Reflection on these different possibilities will make an important 
part of all this apparent: the location of the data, its physical display, and the actual work done with 
the data in terms of premising it, referring to it, and then removing it from view are all things that 
are embedded in some ongoing course of interaction. The interaction may be something that 
precedes the sharing of data, with the data being drawn upon to further fuel that interaction in some 
sense, such as is the case when sat drinking coffee and showing round health data on your 
smartphone. But it may also be initiated in relation to the sharing of the data, where the 
relevance/interest of the data itself serves as an account for why it is being shared, such as might be 
the case with a specific message or image being shown to family or friends. These features of 
occasioning and accountability are critical aspects of how the co-present sharing of personal data 
might be accomplished. 
5.1.3 In the course of living 
Something to note about the sharing of personal data is that, in the ordinary course of living together, 
much of what people might know of one another is readily available through their sharing of the 
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same environment. However, personal data is often tied up within people’s individual devices and 
it is not always just there to be seen. So in certain circumstances personal data may become 
specifically reportable to others in the home. In one home that was studied the husband and wife 
had each recently acquired a Withings Pulse, capable of recording things like the number of steps 
taken, distance covered, etc., as well as a Withings Smart Body Analyzer, which is basically a 
bathroom scales that can measure other things such as body fat. They had taken to reporting readings 
from the scales to one another the first time they saw each other after they had taken their weight. 
They would also recurrently report the number of steps and distance covered shown on their Pulse 
throughout the day, e.g. “I’ve still only done seven thousand” or “Hooray, I’ve reached my target” 
(which is ten thousand as a default). On top of this they would, as a matter of habit, review their 
performance in the evening, just before they went to bed, by using a Withings application on their 
iPad. Here is one such case: 
It is late in the evening and Maud and Simon have just finished watching TV together. Maud picks up her 
iPad from the table, goes to Google Chrome, and does an image search for ‘castle cakes’ in preparation 
for a cake she has to make the following day. She works through saving a few images then goes out of 
Chrome and open the Withings application. She and Simon look at her stats together. 
Maud: I haven’t done much today 
She clicks on the sleep display and works back through from the current day, displaying one day at a time 
Simon:  Why does it say zero there? 
Maud:  I forgot to put it on [her pulse] 
Maud goes back to looking at her weight 
Maud:  Heh. Even my ideal weight [70] is above the blue area. For that it would have to be down 
to 69. 
Simon:  Can I see my figures? 
Maud clicks back to the menu and selects Simon instead 
Simon:  It often fails to register my heart rate [there is no measure for the current day]. My weight 
is going up as well. Why is there no blue area for me? 
Maud:  Because you haven’t set a weight target 
Maud clicks out of the Withings app and goes to Chrome again and opens her Facebook page… 
There are a number of things to note about this. First of all, the sharing of this information with each 
other has become a matter of routine, with it happening at specific points within the overall 
accomplishment of everyday life, and with neither of them bringing into question the fact that the 
other party is reporting such information. Nor is it treated as a matter for comment that one of them 
should open up their iPad and make such information available in doing so, or that the other should 
take an interest in the information and pass comment upon it. As noted above it is also the case here 
that the data is seen to be worthy of report and, again, it is not treated as strange that such reports 
should be forthcoming. Indeed, the points of occasioning and accountability mentioned above are 
covered by these things being taken to be self-evidently newsworthy. However, something to bring 
to particular attention here is the way that the use of the iPad means that data is made visible to the 
other party in an incidental fashion as part of a collection of nightly practices that are all made 
unproblematically visible, including browsing on the internet and looking at Facebook. The right of 
one party (the husband) to see the other party (the wife)’s data is presumed by both of them, and 
vice versa. Thus a good deal of ‘data’ is oriented to as stuff you would routinely share with your 
partner in any case and, because this shareable data is rendered opaque by its capture with digital 
devices, the opaqueness is repaired through ordinary practices of making it visible, be that through 
explicit account or by looking at the data on a device when the other party is going to be able to see 
it as well. Indeed, should one or other of them take measures to avoid revealing this kind of data the 
very act of trying to keep it hidden would itself become accountable. How, for instance, would it be 
if one evening the wife were to say: “are you off to bed now?” before opening her Facebook page. 
Thus, as with many other things, the in situ sharing of personal data is often an incidental feature of 
everyday life, encompassed within the pursuit of everyday routine practices rather than always being 
the subject of explicit forms of sharing such as those outlined above. 
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5.1.4 The local sharing of third party data 
A further refinement of the above relates to how personal data that is not your own but rather 
something that has been already shared with you is then shared with other people. Consider the 
following: 
Samantha: Erm It’s weird in that sense coz I wouldn’t  mind somebody seeing something that I was 
sending, but I’d be uncomfortable about somebody seeing something that Tom [her 
brother] had sent me 
Fieldworker: Okay. Why’s that? 
Samantha: It would feel like more of a breach of privacy because it is something he’s sending 
specifically to me Often it is just like photos of him and Rick [Tom’s partner] or food that 
he’s made or things… that he’s seen that reminded him of me and things like that. And 
it would feel much weirder for somebody to see what he was sending me than- 
Fieldworker: Why would it feel weird? What would feel wrong about it? 
Samantha: Well Tom is a very private person and er I wouldn’t like to share stuff with other people 
that he’s sent specifically to me without having asked his permission to do so 
Fieldworker: Okay. So you need the right to t- t- to be able to share it you feel And er you wouldn’t just 
have that right automatically to share it 
Samantha: No 
Fieldworker: Okay. Does that go for other content that you receive from other people on social media? 
Samantha: Yeah, I don’t- I don’t share stuff like that because as I said it’s something that’s been sent 
specifically to me and I wouldn’t share it without asking somebody if they were okay with 
that 
Here we see how data that has been shared with you by other people is not necessarily oriented to 
in the same way as your own data. In particular there are chains of accountability such that the 
onward sharing of data is organized around one’s right to share it in some way. These may be 
presumptive or they may be literally subject to having been given the right to share it somehow. So, 
in the case of Simon watching Maud using Facebook she was largely oriented to a presumptive right 
to let him look at the content and he himself was oriented to a presumptive right to see that content, 
even though much of what he was seeing had been shared with Maud by other parties. However, for 
Samantha she does not orient to a similar right to share things that have been specifically shared 
with her by her brother. Indeed, in further discussion it became clear that, whilst she would happily 
report to her parents and siblings that she had been in communication with Tom via social media, 
she was not disposed to then evidence this through specifically showing them the content of the 
interchange. 
5.1.5 Keeping things from view 
Of course, the very visibility of things in shared environments can also result in practices that are 
designed to offset the possibility of incidental sharing. Particular articulations of this point in the 
digital realm have already been made by a number of researchers. Hawkey and Inkpen [36], for 
instance, looked at people’s privacy concerns in the context of witnessed online browsing and what 
they termed ‘incidental eavesdropping’. This was deemed to be “information that can be gleaned 
from casually viewing the screen of a user or overhearing a conversation”. Both they and Kaasten 
et al [40] have also extended this consideration to what traces people may leave behind regarding 
their activities for subsequent users through artefacts such as browser histories and saved thumbnails. 
In order to avoid any risk of exposure they suggested that people adapted their browsing activities 
according to different settings, different devices, and the kinds of people they had around them. 
Dourish et al [23] when looking at how people went about managing digital privacy in the workplace 
found that people were employing “subtle practices to achieve privacy and security goals, such as 
positioning a computer screen such that visitors in an office could not see it, or stacking papers 
according to a secret rationale.” In another related study Klasnja et al [44] focused upon how people 
tried to preserve their privacy when using devices in public places and observed that they were using 
strategies such as “tilting or dimming the screen, or finding a seat against the wall”.  
In the studies being drawn upon here there was a range of similar phenomena, with various kinds 
of concerns about visibility being articulated. The following vignette is interesting because it relates 
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the handling of digital content to the handling of other physical components of the home 
environment. The interlocutor here is a 63 year-old reflexologist who runs her practice from home: 
Fieldworker: … your clients are always coming to the house. Are there things that you do to manage 
what they can see at all? 
Christine: Yes, I mean I’m big on er making sure that the whole house isn’t open to their view. So 
I’m forever closing doors and shutting things off. I make sure everything is clear that I 
consider sensitive which is why, when I used to be in that smaller room particularly I did 
not want my laptop there, open while I was about to start a treatment. So that- er, that’s 
when it’s- 
Fieldworker: So that window into your digital world actually you th- you consider ones you prefer to 
have closed to clients as well? 
Christine: Closed off. Absolutely. Absolutely, and e- obviously I have to make sure that I don’t leave 
information about previous clients lying around for now clients to see. So I have to- 
Fieldworker: So it’s both professional and personal reasons kind of wrapped in together? 
Christine: Well absolutely because you know, I could be sued if people felt it was a breach of data 
protection so er I- I::’m- I have to be aware of that. So I don’t have anything lying around 
tha- that in any way gives any window into anything And I don’t keep my purse or my 
phone in the room with me either. That’s always elsewhere 
Fieldworker: Okay. And with regard to the network, I mean if- I mean I- I don’t know that you’re that 
busy that it would be a circumstance but if you had one- clients backing up where one 
was waiting for another one to go, would you give them access to the network? 
Christine: No. Absolutely not. No, no. I wouldn’t even give them access to the television unless 
Brian’s [her husband] in the room watching it! 
In this case we see someone operating a fairly blanket policy that is designed to minimize the risk 
of any kind of incidental sharing of personal information of any kind – digital or physical – with 
visitors to the house with whom the relationship is confined to business. She provides an account 
directed towards breaches of data protection, but in fact she is also closing doors and generally 
constraining their movements so that it is not just data relating to other clients but as much as 
possible of her own personal life she is keeping from view. However, when it comes to other 
members of the same household we begin to see much more nuanced kinds of practices coming into 
play. Here Evelyn, the 21 year-old student living at home, who expressed such concern about not 
sharing anything on Tumblr with others around her unless she chose to do so and could retain control, 
explains how she is actually nonetheless quite happy to browse Tumblr with other people around 
her: 
Erm well being on a phone it’s a smaller screen so there is less oversight and I tend to keep it quite close 
to me anyway, erm So I’m fine with browsing Tumblr when erm when like I’m sitting on a chair downstairs 
and there are people walking about or when we’re about to watch something 
The overt point here is that she can manage keeping things from view quite adequately by simply 
relying upon the size of the screen and the way she holds it in relation to her body. More to the point 
here is the fact that doing this is not, in itself, treated as being accountable by others around her. So 
there is a mutual orientation to the content she is handling not being for general consumption. Indeed, 
it would be far more accountable for someone else in the family to sit beside her or try to lean over 
her shoulder to see what she was up to. So there is a mutually understood right to keep things from 
view that people routinely trade upon such that what might at first sight be viewed as ‘guarded’ 
behaviour is nothing of the sort but rather an everyday method for making manifest the status of 
particular kinds of personal data as ‘not to be shared’. 
There are a couple of things to point out that arise from the contrasting examples above. The 
first of these is the articulation of quite generic, blanket policies regarding whole classes of people 
such as ‘strangers’, ‘visitors’, ‘clients’, etc. when it comes to what might or might not be shared 
with members of such a class. This is not about what you do when Joanne, who is a friend of one of 
your friends and working in a bank comes to have her treatment on a Friday evening, or Aunt Sally 
who you’ve agreed to do a session for during an afternoon visit. When one inquires into the 
particulars of just what is done with this person or that one encounters a world of variation and 
contingency where specific differences of practice are accounted for in ways that make them 
acceptable variants of the overarching policy such that the policy can remain intact. So Joanne can 
sit in the living room and watch telly while she’s waiting because I’ve known her for years and it 
wouldn’t seem right putting her in the waiting room like everyone else. And I don’t need to worry 
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so much about tidying everything out of the way and out of sight for Aunt Sally because she’s my 
aunt and not even a proper client.  
The other thing is that, when it is people who are known and who are specifically identifiable 
and with whom you hold a specific relationship of some kind, there are equally specific bodies of 
practice that come into play. So Evelyn can sit and browse Tumblr in a specific fashion in the living 
room and trust that she does not need to share any of it with those around her, even though they are 
the people with whom she holds the most intimate of relationships. And all of this turns upon the 
manifest way in which she handles the technology and the fact that everyone around her accepts 
that she should handle it that way. Hawkey and Inkpen [36] do note that, in the context of their usual 
browsing habits, many people are actually more uneasy about family members seeing their activity 
than co-workers. However, they do not seek to unpack the particularities of this blanket policy and 
see how it might be operable as an actual body of practice, turning instead to the formulation of  
‘four dimensions that directly impact the privacy comfort level [of people] in a given situation’. 
That is, they seek to make general formulations of policy yet more abstract and generic. But what is 
interesting here is the evident tension between what Evelyn has to say about her practice and the 
observation of the interactions around health data and Facebook we saw in the case of Maud and 
Simon earlier on, where personal use of social media was notably not being kept from the view of 
another intimate. So, there are intimates and there are intimates and they are not all of a piece. 
Instead, quite specific rights and obligations pertain to each specific relationship within a household 
and it is at this level that the practical politics of sharing comes into play, which is a politics of 
assumed rights that is almost never overtly articulated outside of a breach (such as someone pausing 
to look over Evelyn’s shoulder or Maud actively waiting to look at Facebook until Simon has gone 
to bed).  
5.1.6 Accountably appropriate sharing practices 
The implications of the preceding materials are that a great deal of personal data is already being 
shared on a routine basis within the confines of cohort relationships that are already well-understood 
and where expectable patterns of accountability for what is or is not revealed and what is or is not 
done with information are oriented to in ways that are frequently very similar to other ways of 
sharing information. What is shared may be in some ways distinct in terms of detail and 
representation, but it is not as if cyclists were not telling one another about their state of health before 
the use of fitbits or husbands and wives not telling one another about their weight before the 
invention of Withings scales. And husbands were routinely listening in on telephone conversations 
between their wives and family members or friends before the invention of Facebook. 
What should be stressed here is that the practical politics is to be found in just how specific 
instances of sharing personal data are organised. It is visible in the haecceity – the just whens and 
just wheres - of the sharing. It is present in just how the possible occasioning of sharing is picked 
up or set aside. And it is present in just who is oriented to as a potential recipient of the data. Some 
have rights to ask for it. Some have rights to expect it to be produced as a matter of course. And 
some could only ever expect to be given access to it upon the production of a specifically appropriate 
account. We have also seen how the politics of the sharing is organised around how the surrounding 
accounts for the data are themselves constructed according to different recipients and different 
circumstances. And we have seen how it is present in the very reasoning attached to what should or 
should not be shared. All of this adds up to a body of accountably appropriate sharing practices that 
cannot be divorced from, indeed are reflexively constitutive of, the circumstances in which they are 
used. 
5.1.6 What is visible in the breach? 
So far we have examined a range of ways in which people are already oriented to the management 
of personal data with regard to what is shared with other people around them. Now the thing with 
personal data is that it presents a number of challenges for the operation of these ordinary ways of 
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managing what is shared. For a start its recognisability as useable personal data is not always evident, 
prior to it having been gathered and displayed in some way.  Another thing is that assumptions 
regarding who may get access to personal information are not always adequate for the handling of 
personal data and its articulation through digital devices.  Indeed, recognition that something has 
been revealed may only come latterly after sharing has already taken place. These are all issues we 
shall return to in the conclusion because they carry implications for how designers might need to be 
thinking about the handling of personal data. Over the course of the ethnographic work a range of 
breaches of ordinary expectations were uncovered regarding the sharing of information that have 
turned upon the fact that the vehicles for sharing have been digital devices drawing upon personal 
data. It is worth briefly examining some of these breaches because they are instructive, alla 
Garfinkel [29], for the assumptions made about the ordinary orderliness of the world they reveal. 
5.1.8 The recipients of shared data 
A particular issue that has already been partially reported elsewhere [75] is the potential for new 
technology to surface information about one another’s activities that would ordinarily be expected 
to remain out of view. Or, at least, for the circumstances to not arise where one might be obliged to 
account for it, and for others to be put in a position where they have little choice but to request such 
an account. 
As we have already commented, the cohort that are most likely to call people to account for such 
activity are those with whom more intimate relationships hold, e.g. parents, siblings, partners, etc. 
In the following excerpt the issue relates to what is being made visible about a teenage girl’s late-
night internet activity to her parents. The fieldworker and the participant, Coralie, are looking at 
some periods of exceptional activity in a data visualization tool. They are both sat at a table in the 
living room and the participant’s parents are sat on a nearby sofa watching television while they 
talk: 
Fieldworker:  Look at the time. This is after 3 in the morning 
(Coralie glances over towards her parents) 
(Fieldworker talking her through the pattern) 
Fieldworker:  It’s completely different to every other day.  
Coralie:  When was it? 
Fieldworker:  This is late at night – from a Saturday to a Sunday. If you look you can see you were 
using it through to late into the morning 
(Coralie casting more nervous glances at her parents)  
It’s a familiar trope in households with teenage children that they take themselves off to their 
bedrooms and their parents never know what they’re up to. For younger teenagers this may become 
centred around a concern they are looking at porn, or watching violent videos, or chatting online 
with dubious strangers, etc. At the same time, for teenagers themselves the closed bedroom door 
provides a vehicle whereby they can themselves hold their parents to account for any breach of that 
barrier and inspection of their activities. This may or may not be contested but the door remains as 
a visibility management device. Other discussions with Coralie had revealed that she almost 
exclusively used her laptop and went online in her bedroom. Use of the laptop in the living room 
was rare and the use of it with the fieldworker at the living room table was a notable departure from 
her routine, such that it was remarkable to her parents as well and only readily accountable because 
of the interaction taking place with a ‘guest’. What we see in the example above, then, is the closed 
door and its operational efficacy being breached by the surfacing within earshot of her parents of 
activities that would normally be happening behind the bedroom door, hence her evident discomfort.  
As we saw previously with a husband and wife sharing heath data, many instances of sharing 
personal data are part-and-parcel of the realization of existing routine practices. However, what was 
also seen on a number of occasions was personal data and its visualization resulting in the exposure 
of activities that people would normally take for granted would remain invisible. 
Here is another example that was captured during the sensor data study. In this case a husband 
and wife are working with a researcher through a visualization of motion and humidity data for their 
bathroom: 
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Susannah:  So what are we saying, we’re saying the 5th?  That was Mary being off and the 6th was 
you being at home.  Oooh, what did you do? 
Frank:  I didn’t do anything 
Susannah:  You did at 12 o’clock, look at that 
Frank:  Where?  Nothing 
Susannah:  No, here 
Frank:  I could have been up late cos I’ve had this headache thing… I’ve been a bit poorly, oh 
give me sympathy.  So, that’s probably me getting up late isn’t it, having a late shower.  
It’s high for a long time…I don’t remember having that long a shower.  
Susannah:  Yeah but you could have had a shower and then you could have had a shave. 
It is, of course, the case that people’s bathroom practices can be subject to comment as a feature of 
ordinary life in all sorts of ways. Toothbrushes may be left on the side or the toothpaste squeezed in 
the ‘wrong’ way. Towels may be left in a heap on the floor. All of the hot water may be used up. 
And so on. People can also specifically make their own bathroom practices visible as a vehicle for 
calling others to account. For instance, calling out to say they are about to have a shower so that 
other people don’t turn on taps and make the shower run suddenly hot or cold; saying where they 
like to keep their flannel because someone keeps moving it; calling out their weight from the 
bathroom because they’ve just stood on the scales and it’s gone down; and so on. In all these kinds 
of cases you normally understand somehow what will be available and manage your affairs 
accordingly. The presence of this new window into what you do stands outside ordinary everyday 
reasoning, especially with regard to the expectability of the possibility of needing to provide an 
account and the knowledge of how your activities might be routinely made available. And this has 
the scope to cause serious trouble. 
Here, in the same family, we see sensors revealing data about their daughter, Sally’s toilet 
practices that go to the heart of the accountability issue: 
Susannah:  So, I’m aware that there’s evidence that Sally’s gone for a wee when she’s spent most 
of her life trying to, at the moment, defining her space and David [their son] is defining 
his space.  So now there’s evidence, so now I can see into these spaces, so there’s a 
sense of invasion.  I can now look and find out who went for a wee when and where they 
went. 
The problem with surfacing data of this nature is that the accountability cuts strongly both ways: 
those in receipt of the data are as accountable for taking an interest in it as are the people who are 
generating the data and unwittingly sharing it in the first place. In shared environments there are 
many things that people have, over unknown stretches of time, developed ways of keeping 
unremarkable so that as far as possible people are not obliged to have to continually account for 
‘uncomfortable truths’, or to have to account for how you handle the management of those 
uncomfortable truths if you become privy to them in some way. But we are moving towards a world 
where we may need to find new methods for rendering uncomfortable truths unremarkable, and it 
would be wrong for designers to be complacent about how such uncomfortable truths might get 
surfaced in the first place. 
5.1.9 How data may get used 
A further matter that cropped up over the course of the studies being discussed here that is tightly 
related to the preceding set of issues is the way in which, once personal data is made available to 
others around you, it may then be used by those other parties. Once again the problem here is bound 
up with the fact that people have not yet fully organized the management of their personal data such 
that inadvertent and awkward revelations can be foreseen and avoided before they ever take place. 
In this next example Florence and her mother are visiting a boulangerie. Florence has been 
helping her mother build a website for the novelty cakes she makes and has been taking photos of 
the cakes with her phone. The fact that her mother knows this results in an uncomfortable situation 
for Florence: 
Fieldworker: Do you ever give i- er access to your phone to anybody else at all? 
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Florence: Er:m, I mean I do, like, when I’m showing photos or things online to people mostly, but 
er  
Fieldworker: In what way do you mean you give them access? Do you kind of hold your phone and 
show it to them? 
Florence: Yeah. 
Fieldworker: But you don’t let them physically take the- 
Florence: No, no. That was er actually something quite uncomfortable for me that happened the 
other day when erm- because you know er I went to the cake shop with Mum and she 
started talking about one of the cakes she’d made and then she asked me if I had any 
photos on my phone, and er I did so I just held it up to show at first but then Mum took 
the phone from me and passed it to the- to the man so that he could flick through the 
photos and look and I did not like that at all 
A core part of the trouble here revolves around the fact that there is a mismatch of understanding 
about what the work of showing might amount to. Her mother knows the photos are there and is 
only oriented to being able to show those photos to support the ongoing interaction. Florence, 
however, is oriented to the fact that these are just some of the photos in her undifferentiated photo 
library. For her it is the photo library that is potentially being put on display. This underscores the 
relative crudity of digital resources and demonstrates the fact that personal data may be bundled up 
in ways that do not reflect adequately people’s ordinary reasoning about content and what may be 
done with it, and this is something that designers would again do well to reflect upon. 
We will shortly be looking at the sharing of personal data online. However, there are some ways 
in which data shared online may nonetheless lead to troubles in co-present interaction. Here we see 
an example of how content shared on Facebook may be exposed in awkward ways that are 
challenging to deal with: 
Sylvie:  I tried for a while having people graded by their friendship status. So I’d have like real 
true friends, and then I had my work friends, who would ask me to be their friend but I 
felt kind of like socially awkward saying no to on Facebook, so I had them as 
acquaintances. It got really confusing. You know, someone might graduate from being 
an acquaintance to an actual friend but they still work with you, and then they come into 
work and say “oh I saw that picture of you at the park, it was really cute” and everyone 
else goes “what picture? I didn’t see that on Facebook.” So, I’ve given up on that. It just 
got really hard. 
Once again there is a mismatch of ordinary assumptions in play here. This revolves around an 
important issue: the practices people adopt to try and manage their personal data in the digital realm 
are not simply just there to be seen and oriented to by other people. These are not yet practices that 
just anyone would recognise and organise their interactions in respect of. In many cases they have 
not yet reached the point of becoming routine member’s methods and cannot yet be taken for granted. 
It is not the case, of course, that people were not being embarrassed by awkward revelations before 
technology entered the scene. However, the interesting thing about examples such as the one above 
is that the source of trouble is not so much the content itself as the lack of a developed intersubjective 
understanding of the practices people are using to manage their digital content. How might Sylvie’s 
co-workers have known that she was adopting a practice of organising her Facebook friends in such 
a fine-grained fashion when this is not what just anyone does when they manage their friendship 
relations on Facebook? Thus the practices present here are part of a practical politics of sharing that 
has yet to adequately evolve, and a key sticking point in it all is the extent to which technology is a) 
supporting and b) making visible the practices people are trying to adopt to handle personal data. 
5.2 Sharing personal data online 
5.2.1 Managing how the data is shared 
The materials above have focused on how personal data might be shared or not shared with other 
people who occupy the same environment. However, it is of course the case that an increasingly 
large variety of the digital activities people undertake are geared towards interaction with parties 
and organisations who are not co-present but rather accessed through networks online. These parties 
may, in principle, be anywhere and, unlike the local cohort, may be oriented to as both known 
members of various cohorts and as unknown or unknowable beyond what common-sense 
assumptions may be made about them and their interests. This has an important impact upon the 
The Practical Politics of Sharing Personal Data                                      
17  
                                                                                                                                         
 
 
sharing of personal data because there is a vital interplay of rights and obligations and 
intersubjectively established accountabilities according to the specific nature of the relationship in 
play. And if there is no established relationship because a party is unknown or unknowable then the 
grounds of mutual accountability are hard to assess beyond the broadest of moral assumptions (e.g. 
‘no-one in their right mind would do that!’). 
One particular way this pans out is an exhibited concern with allowing data to be shared before 
you have had an opportunity to inspect the data and potentially repair it or at least premise the data 
with some kind of an account. Something that made this kind of interest manifest in the data 
collected during the studies was a worry people had about data being potentially made available 
‘live’. All of the following excerpts were articulated by participants in a study where the concept 
being explored was the collection of sensor-based data that could reveal information about your 
patterns of living and then sold through an online marketplace to external service providers. 
Celine:  I wouldn’t agree to live, I would agree to an embargo for example, a month a week, two 
weeks, because you can deduce whether we are home or not from that data if it was live, 
you can deduce the actions of the people. 
Connie:  But it’s different isn’t it, live sharing, there’s quite a different set of feelings that this could 
evoke… I think you could manipulate the data anyway by not using that room or not 
weighing yourself, or not very much, or only weighing yourself when you’re feeling… or 
dieting on purpose in order to record it so that somebody else approves of you.  So I 
think when you’re sharing live you can’t do anything about it so people naturally want 
approval from other people so I think that would influence you so I would I would feel less 
comfortable sharing live I think. 
Andrew:  Some of the data I’d be quite happy to share live.  So, sharing live weight data with my 
GP would be fine. With my insurance company, though, it wouldn’t, because it’s the 
purpose, what they might use it for… 
Note that in each of these cases there is an issue with live data because they feel it would be hard 
for them to control what other reason-able recipients might make of it: potential house-breakers; 
people from whom you might be seeking approval; or insurance companies. Here each of the parties 
is in some sense an unknown and generic member of those categories, so accountabilities are equally 
generic: what anyone might expect of house-breakers, potential approval-givers, or insurance 
assessors. In each of these cases there are still ways in which the interests of the parties being shared 
with are open to being reasoned about so there are commonsense assumptions about each of the 
categories in play. But sometimes it can also devolve to being just people in general as well: 
Celine:  I wouldn’t be content to share it with anybody, except friends or people I know or who 
might have a reason to… why would you want to have it? Why would anybody want to 
have it? 
Of course, much of the time online data is being shared with known cohorts where the understood 
grounds of relationships are in play. The following sections examine some of the ways the practical 
politics of sharing gets shaped around this. 
5.2.2 Managing potential recipients 
A great deal of the sharing of personal data online happens now via various social media platforms. 
This was visible across the studies and there are several mechanisms people may use to control just 
who the recipients of that data might be. 
One such mechanism is through actively tailoring just who is a member of which cohort that 
you share with. 
Fieldworker: And the Facebook friends are? `Erm who?  
Chloe: People I know… That’s basically most of my family, er and my friends and a few people 
that I know from school who asked me as a friend and so I just accepted coz I know them. 
But if it’s anybody I don’t know I won’t accept  
Fieldworker: And, and do they overlap with your Twitter people? Do you have the same that you’re er- 
as Facebook friends that you’re following on Twitter or following you? 
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Chloe: No 
Fieldworker: No connection between them at all? 
Chloe: No, my social life has nothing to do with my Twitter life… Twitter life is internet life. And 
Facebook life is social life 
Time and again in the studies there were examples of people taking great care over just who they 
follow and whom they encourage to follow them on social media platforms. This was particularly 
notable with regard to constraints being placed upon the opportunities for people they know in the 
real world to follow them. This shall be discussed further below in terms of avoiding real-world 
accountability. However, note here straight away that this management of cohorts amounts in online 
practice to management of sharing personal data because the information shared on such platforms 
only goes to the people who are following you. And it was clear that people actively reasoned about 
the mechanism in this way. 
With this in mind some will even go so far as to adopt pseudonyms for distinct interactional 
environments7: 
Melanie:  Okay so Tumblr’s more interesting because I have my:::: m::ain account where I’m me, I 
have my::; (.) art account where I’m me, but then I actually have a joint account on Tumblr 
with M [a friend] where we pose as our supervillain characters 
Fieldworker: So what’s the distinction between yo::u as you and you as your art account? 
Melanie: Er:::m coz me I can just post whatever I’d- I’d have to say Tumblr is probably the place 
where I’m the most (.) personal, where I er, will share stories that I wouldn’t share with 
just anyone 
Fieldworker: Okay 
Melanie: Er:::::m But on my art account I- I’m still::: me but er::m (.) bu::::t I try and keep it a bit 
more professional … I have two main kind of online  pseudo- pseudo- (.) pseudonyms 
which are Melanie Tea [anonymised], as in Tea the drink and er:::m, and O T O 
[anonymised], and on some places I’m both, and some places I’m one or the other 
Whilst this does not amount to the management of personal data per se, it was evident in the studies 
that an important part of the reasoning attached to the adoption of pseudonyms is the avoidance of 
being discoverable online by people who know you. People actively seek out others they know on 
social media platforms and will not hesitate to make friend or follower requests if they recognise 
someone. The easiest way to steer this off is to make yourself unrecognizable. In this way there is 
no need to potentially have to account for why you have turned down or ignored a friend or follower 
request to people to whom you are routinely accountable in other ways. But it also carries the 
advantage that there will be less chance of sharing personal data with people you would not 
ordinarily wish to share it with. And it is a testament to the current crudity of such tools that people 
have to adopt such blunt instruments to manage their accountability to others and their sharing of 
personal information. 
An alternative method is to actively select just whom content will be shared with on a case-by-
case basis. Here is an example from a study of digital privacy management where a couple being 
interviewed together were discussing how videos of their children were shared with other people: 
Fieldworker:  Who has access to the videos on Vimeo? 
Kit:  It’s just family, isn’t it? 
Tim:  Yeah, family. 
Kit:  They tend to be on holiday, it’s not like there’s anything - if the kids were, say, running 
around in the nude on the beach, then I wouldn’t like it. 
Tim:  Yeah. 
Kit:  But I don’t think there’s anything like that really. 
Here the problem is perhaps more acute in that the personal data in question involves family 
members who may or may not wish to have their activities open to inspection by other people. So 
at least a part of the reasoning here relates to issues that were already outlined above regarding the 
sharing of third party data. 
 
7 There is, of course, a whole literature regarding the management of online ‘identity’ that relates to this, e.g. [80] but we 
have not the space to tackle this topic directly here. 
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5.2.3 Specifically targeting recipients 
The above example might be seen to be a case of specifically targeting certain recipients, and in a 
certain sense it is. However, sharing personal data can be even more specifically targeted in online 
interaction in various ways. In the following example from the study of the management of digital 
privacy one of the participants recounts how Facebook Messenger was used by another family 
member to interact with her about a topic she clearly didn’t want to share with just anyone: 
My niece, indeed all the younger members of my family, have created a group on Facebook called ‘Dubois 
family’… And in fact two or three times I was contacted by Messenger by my nephew or my niece… about 
something private that didn’t concern the rest of the family. And because they didn’t know my email 
address they contacted me that way instead… about private stuff, someone who had a miscarriage, 
another where they wanted an address, things like that. So it’s true that whilst I don’t use that so much, I 
do use the direct messaging on Facebook. It was a thing I didn’t really use before but I’ve been using it 
now for a couple of months … It’s private. I think for the other person as well it’s very private because 
otherwise they would have sent it to the whole group. She also phoned me, but younger people nowadays 
of twenty, twenty five, they find it easier to use Facebook, and so she found it was a good way of talking 
to me directly. 
There are some interesting things here that are worth teasing out a little.  Now clearly there are a 
number of vehicles for talking to someone on a private channel when you’re wanting to discuss 
sensitive matters such as having a miscarriage. You could do it by email, or text message, use Skype, 
maybe even, as Denise mentions above, make a phone call. But there’s this thing here of them 
having made a family group and doing their family interactions in that fashion. A comparable 
example to think of here might be family homes and where people have conversations within them. 
And then one might think about private conversations between, say mothers and daughters. Now, if 
the daughter has a trouble to communicate with her mother about but doesn’t want the rest of the 
family to know, she might ask her mother to come into her bedroom, or go visit her mother in her’s, 
or she might wait until just she and her mother are alone in the kitchen or wherever to broach the 
topic. What would be much stranger would be for her to send her mother a note, or a text message, 
or an email, or even a direct message on Facebook, even though she probably could. Denise puts 
the choice of Messenger down to her niece’s age, but it also needs to be recognised here that there 
is an existing place where family conversations are happening and her niece has found a resource 
within that space for having a private conversation. There is no special work to be done or 
accounting for the choice of channel to be concerned about because they are already communicating 
via Facebook. At the same time, because it is in the nature of direct messaging that it be one to one, 
the niece can hold Denise accountable for what she may then do with the information, and the 
presence of this accountability is also visible to Denise. So what we see here is people finding within 
an online resource a practical solution to the sharing of highly personal data and, most especially, 
accomplishing that through a resource that is ready-to-hand for both parties rather than having to 
go out and invent some other one. 
5.2.4 Avoiding real world accountability 
It was mentioned above that an important feature of the practical politics of sharing data online is 
the way in which people actively manage the cohorts that will be able to see their data through friend 
and follower relationships on social media platforms. Time and again the reasoning attached to this 
body of practice was articulated in terms of how people could use this mechanism to avoid real 
world accountability for the things they were sharing. Here are just a few examples: 
Fieldworker: And what kinds of people are following you [on Tumblr]? 
Melanie:  Erm Very few people who know me in real life. Very, very few. There’s literally only Lionel 
and Tom [her brothers] I think who actually know me in real life. That’s probably why my- 
I’m more comfortable being more personal there coz there’s less people I actually know 
personally 
-- 
Paul:  I’ve got Facebook and I’ve got Twitter. I have a network of friends on Facebook that 
includes my family, some colleagues, things like that. On Twitter, even though I use my 
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proper name, I don’t follow anybody that I know personally. I quite explicitly avoid 
connections with especially work colleagues on Twitter. I don’t follow any of them and I 
don’t want that link to be made, because I want to be able to behave in a different way 
on Twitter. 
-- 
Simon: Most people I follow on Twitter, they don’t know me and I don’t know them. So I’m free 
on Twitter. [Laughs] I’m free there, I do what I want.  
Something to take note of here is that the platform where people were choosing to share data that 
they would not want to be held accountable for in the real world differs from person to person. In 
the above examples, one person is speaking of Tumblr, two others of Twitter, but there are other 
examples where it is Facebook and even where it is a different account on the same social media 
platform. The point to emphasize here, though, is that the orientation is not directed towards a 
specific platform but rather towards a practice whereby real-world accountability can be set aside. 
It’s important to understand here that the concern is not with dispensing with all accountability 
entirely, but rather with managing just who you might be accountable to and in what way.  
5.2.5 Managing what is visible 
When the sharing of personal data in the context of co-present interaction was discussed, one of the 
primary concerns people exhibited related to what was being made visible to others around them 
and how to manage that visibility in various ways. Part of this was focused upon what was being 
overtly shared with others or not. However, another aspect of it was focused upon trying to limit the 
scope for data to be shared incidentally, unwittingly, or even unknowingly with others who might 
happen to occupy the same space as you. The risk of incidental data being shared about you online 
may seem to be particularly related to various kinds of security breaches and hacks, or big data style 
harvesting of your interactions by large organisations such as operators of social media platforms 
or governments. It has already been discussed elsewhere [21] that most people tend to orient to this 
as something more or less unavoidable and to continue regardless. In the same place it was also 
noted that some people will go to great lengths to try and minimize the scope for this through a 
variety of technical strategies. However, it is also the case that the concerns people have about what 
they may be making available incidentally can be reasoned about at a much more parochial everyday 
level and with regard to people who one already knows. And this can lead to some quite nuanced 
approaches to managing what is therefore made visible. The following is an extract from a 
discussion with a participant in a study geared towards investigating people’s online practices to 
inform the development of a ‘context-aware’ media delivery platform: 
Charlene: I use the phone more than- the computer because that can give the impression to other 
people that I’m not at home… Whilst when I’m on the computer it’s obvious that- … I 
prefer to make my location more obscure (laughing) … Because for example if I want to 
end a conversation with someone I can say ‘Sorry, I’m about to take the metro, sorry’. … 
Or ‘I’ve got a meeting’ 
In this example Charlene is actively managing the ways in which her practices may make visible 
incidentally her current location. At root there’s a quite simple set of assumptions going on here. If 
people you know are interacting with you via a desktop machine then the chances are you also know 
where that desktop machine is, most often in that person’s home. That means you can work with an 
expectation of them being at home to organise your interaction with them, say in terms of their likely 
availability. If they are interacting with you via a laptop and you happen to know that, then the 
options for being elsewhere are greater, but most people still use their laptops in a more restricted 
and knowable group of settings, so you are still able to make assumptions on the basis of that. 
However, if people are interacting with you via a mobile phone and they make it visible that this is 
the case, then they could in principle be anywhere where there’s a signal, so it’s hard to make 
assumptions about what they might or might not be doing in relation to where they may currently 
be. What the above example exposes neatly is that this reasoning has itself become a sociological 
object, a thing that can be reasoned about in its own right and managed and worked with to a variety 
of ends. In particular we can see here how commonsense assumptions about what people do with 
their devices provide in their own right a resource for thereby managing what might be made 
available incidentally to others.  
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5.2.6 Choosing whether to share data at all 
In the preceding section reference was made to a commonplace assumption that there are 
organisations ‘out there’, so to speak, who will have access to one’s personal data regardless. Whilst 
there is a background acceptance of this in place8 when many online exchanges take place, it also 
informs a broad and generic ‘policy’ that people often articulate regarding choices they make as to 
whether to reveal data at all: 
Christine: if it was something tha- that I considered to be that sensitive, although there was a 
hideous picture, but i-  if- if it was something that I considered to be that sensitive I 
wouldn’t do i- I wouldn’t use it 
-- 
Carrie: If I’m not happy to share it then it doesn’t go anywhere. 
-- 
Alice: I wouldn’t put anything on that I wasn’t happy for anybody to see. Managing real private 
stuff is – stuff shouldn’t exist, that’s the level of it. It doesn’t get written down. It doesn’t 
get put in a photo. It doesn’t exist. Definitely do not put online. 
The description here of this reasoning amounting to a generic policy is important. Whilst risk of 
exposure and sensitivity of data stands as a ready account for not sharing something, it is also just 
as commonplace for people to share things online that they subsequently have cause to regret. Indeed, 
the literature is replete with examples of postings on social media that have escaped the control of 
their authors and resulted in embarrassment (see, for instance, [41][47][59][60][69][72][78][79]). 
As has been recurrently pointed out in this paper, the sharing of personal data is something that is 
actively occasioned and there is a calculus of accountability in play that informs what is or isn’t 
shared on any occasion. Even at a gross level people are not sharing personal data with abstract 
classes of others but rather quite specific others about whom certain categorical aspects may be 
presumed (e.g. insurance people will raise your premiums if they find out you have a life-threatening 
disease). Thus, whilst people will articulate generic polices in response to questions they understand 
to be asking for what they generally do, when it comes to deciding whether something will actually 
be shared or not, the decision turns upon the specific occasion and what should be practically and 
accountably done now. And what is done now is not always what one would express to be the general 
policy. Instead, if questioned on the matter people will find ways of making the specific instance an 
allowable exception or somehow still honouring the policy in principle if not in practice. Inevitably 
this leads to trouble. The difficulty is that the nuanced reasoning people adopt about how the 
practical politics of sharing should play out, based upon their ordinary everyday understandings 
about how sharing should take place, is not always commensurate with the organisation and 
operation of digital systems, which do not adhere to the same principles of situated reasoning. More 
than this, it is hard to see how they could. 
5.2.7 Sharing online versus sharing in person: differences and similarities 
In the examination of the practical politics of sharing with regard to the sharing of personal data in 
co-present interaction it was noted that a great deal of personal data is already being shared on a 
routine basis within the grounds of established relationships with established patterns of 
accountability that are not far-removed from other kinds of routine information sharing practices. It 
was also stressed that the practical politics is to be found in the haecceity - the occasioned and 
situated grounds – of the sharing. On top of this the presence of specific rights and expectations 
were noted that are made manifest in just how the sharing is accomplished according to the recipients 
 
8 This is itself an important point because, for the larger part, it is clear that people do not sit and concern themselves with 
this afresh each time they share personal data online. Rather, actively reasoning about whether something might be made 
visible to third parties is an occasioned matter. That is, to take an extreme example, members of extremist organisations 
might take pause before sharing something that would risk making this visible to government, police or military 
authorities. As we also go onto point out in this section, however, it is notable how often the background expectation 
remains even in such extreme circumstances, and there are plenty of examples of people being caught out in just this 
fashion. 
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of what is shared.  What we have seen in the sharing of personal data in non co-present 
circumstances, online, is something broadly similar. The sharing is once again occasioned and 
recipient-designed. People are once again oriented to what is or isn’t made visible and seek to 
manage that accordingly, including sophisticated reasoning about what may be shared incidentally. 
What is different in online sharing is the relatively crude tools available for managing visibility, 
just who the information will be shared with, and what kinds of accounts can be shaped within and 
around the content of the data being shared. 
Something that underscores the consistency of reasoning across the sharing of personal data in 
co-present interaction and online is the extent to which concerns that are surfaced reflect the same 
kinds of considerations: Who is going to see the data? And, How is the data going to be used? 
5.2.8 The recipients of shared data 
As was noted above, an important difference between sharing personal data online and sharing it in 
co-present interaction is that the mechanisms available for exercising subtlety in how the sharing 
might be shaped to specific recipients are limited in online interaction. We’ve already seen how 
online sharing can produce unwanted accountability in co-present interaction with regard to the 
sharing of photographs on Facebook. However, the concern can extend beyond this and breaches 
reveal the extent to which cohort management through friend and follower relationships is a blunt 
instrument at best. 
In the following example Michel expresses his frustration with the limited resources he has 
available to him for controlling what kinds of things get shared with whom on Facebook: 
Michel:  One of the reasons why Carrie is not so sensitive about posting family photos on 
Facebook is because pretty well the only network who get to see that are family and 
friends. Whereas with me, the network who can actually see that includes work 
colleagues, some of whom I don’t even know very well even. I mean, we’ve had photos 
of me in fancy dress for instance on Facebook and it’s become clear that other people 
have had access to those things! 
Fieldworker:  So it’s other people’s stuff that you’re in and they’ve put up? 
Michel:  It’s never stuff that I share myself, no, ‘cause I don’t do that kind of stuff.  
Carrie:  I do, of fancy dress (laughs). Have you seen that one (Carrie holds up her iPad to Paul, 
and then turns it to show the fieldworker). 
Fieldworker:  (Laughs at photo of them both in fancy dress). 
Michel:  (Laughs).  
Carrie:  It’s stuff like that he doesn’t want me to put on. 
Michel:  This is the problem for me. I can control it all I like myself, but I have no control over what 
other people do. 
In some respects this reflects the example where sharing via Facebook caused trouble with how to 
organise relationships with co-workers. Here too there is an issue with how to manage distinctions 
between people who are apparently members of the same cohort, such as work colleagues, but with 
whom there are in fact gradations of rights, obligations and accountabilities that, in co-present 
interaction are managed eternally on a case by case basis. Indeed, the original example cited from 
Sacks is handling exactly this order of problem. With the ordering systems available on social media 
platforms people are pushed to what amount to generic sharing mechanisms which assume that all 
people in the same bucket are essentially the same when, in fact, everyone is potentially unique 
depending on just what is being shared in this particular instance.   
However, this example also exposes more than this because, when people who have relationships 
in the real world are also friends and followers on social media platforms, there are all sorts of ways 
in which what is shared by one may become visible across a shared cohort, even though the 
reasoning each would apply to the specific data being shared may differ according to a wide range 
of possible rationales. This presents a fundamental issue. In online sharing like this people are not 
just pushed to generic solutions for sharing particular items of personal data themselves. They are 
also obliged to apply in advance and as a matter of course generic policies for the sharing of data. 
As has been previously discussed elsewhere [17], in ordinary everyday reasoning generic policies 
are typically used as either post hoc rationales around which particular accounts may be shaped for 
actions undertaken, or as blanket articulations of a point of view. They are not typically turned to 
and used to shape in advance specific instances of interaction. Indeed, it would be laborious to say 
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the least if every interaction we undertook required prior consideration in these terms. Instead, in 
practice the just whats and just hows of any matter are always related to the specific case in hand. 
When we are engaged in co-present interaction we manage the boundaries of what is visible and 
just how what is visible is articulated through a range of mundane practices that revolve around just 
how things are said, just who they are said to, just when they are said, just where they are said, and 
so on. Digital systems do not currently provide us with the same kinds of fine-grained mechanisms 
for accomplishing this. To do it presently would mean that for everything shared on social media 
we would have to take pause and reason about the current cohort we are sharing with and reason 
about how we might either need to change the cohort on this occasion or modify the content so that 
it is naturally and appropriately accountable to all potential recipients. That is clearly not what 
happens and so people live instead with the consequences and have to manage the breaches as they 
occur. What is breached, it turns out, is the practical, local politics of sharing, even if the generic 
politics that we might formulate in the abstract is apparently untouched. 
5.2.9 How data may get used 
Another important difference with the sharing of personal data online relates to the extent to which 
people may exercise control over how the data is then used through established patterns of 
accountability. In the studies it was found that people often articulate worries about how much they 
can control what is done with their data as a general concern. However, it is instances where they 
are confronted with its actual use that cause the most consternation. In the following example Sara 
expresses worries about the fact that recent advertising she has seen on Facebook would suggest 
that it has recognised she is Jewish: 
There’s one thing that worried me though. Do you remember that time – my family’s Jewish, and my uncle 
sometimes posts things, just once or twice, about searching for family in the Ukraine and stuff, and I was 
starting to find a shop selling everything Jewish coming up advertising on my page. So they’ve obviously 
made a connection that somewhere in the family there is somebody Jewish, and they’ve advertised that 
to me so that means obviously that it’s visible to somebody. It makes you very aware that people are 
watching what you’re doing. It’s like I was explaining to Hannah [her teenage daughter] the other day. 
She was getting ads for pregnancy tests and she says, why am I getting this stuff. I said it’s targeted 
because you’re a teenage girl. And she said, but I’ve never gone on any site like that, I’ve never looked 
at anything. I said it doesn’t matter, they can tell by the type of sites that you do go on to – they can put 
you within an age group and sex group and so you’re targeted. She really doesn’t understand that even 
so. She says I go on gaming sites, I could be a boy. Yeah, you could, but even so the indications that you 
give are a flag to somebody. 
There are two matters to be considered here. One concern she expresses is that the data has been 
used. However, the other relates to the fact that she does not understand how this data has been 
acquired because it’s not data she believes she has personally shared. From the account we can see 
that this was the case for her daughter as well. A key issue to reflect upon here in that case is: What 
counts as sharing in the digital domain? The cited example makes it clear that for most people at 
present the system is opaque. This goes beyond what we have just been saying about the crudity of 
tools available for managing relationships online and the way they pre-configure sharing on a 
generic basis. What we can now see is that it is not just that digital systems oblige generic rather 
than situated reasoning to exercise management, thereby derailing the case by case shaping which 
is at the core of the practical politics of sharing. It is also that digital systems do not necessarily 
count as sharing what people would recognise as a practice of sharing and do not make themselves 
evidently accountable for the handling of what is shared in the same way. This, of course, goes to 
the core of understanding what counts as data, and, more than this even, what may be done with 
personal data by digital systems as opposed to what may be done with it by other people where 
certain aspects of everyday intersubjective reasoning may be brought to bear. 
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6. ENABLING THE PRACTICAL POLITICS OF SHARING 
This paper has used a range of studies of the everyday sharing of personal data to examine what the 
practical politics of sharing personal data looks like under two contrasting conditions: the sharing 
of data in co-present interaction; and the sharing of data in distributed interaction, i.e., online. Along 
the way we have seen how there is a variety of existing practices for handling the sharing of personal 
data, many of them very similar to pre-existing practices for sharing personal information, or at least 
grounded in a similar body of reasoning. At the grossest level this may be seen to cut across two 
broad dimensions: 1) What is made available to whom and when; and 2) How what is shared is to 
be understood (and what may therefore be done with it).  
With regard to the first of these, in circumstances where personal data is being shared in co-
present interaction people do things like managing access itself through physical control of their 
devices, managing just who the recipients are and managing what is visible to others both as a matter 
of routine and as a matter of keeping stuff from view. In online interaction people may manage when 
their data is made available, they may manage who gets sight of it through mechanisms such as 
friend and follower relationships, they may exploit commonsense understandings of how technology 
is used to limit what can be made of their activities, and they may, of course, just choose not to share 
things at all.  
With regard to the second dimension, in co-present interaction people actively manage the exact 
situation in which data is shared and they craft how others may orient to it through its juxtaposition 
with verbal accounts. We also saw that people are highly attentive to their own rights with regard to 
how they may then make use of personal data that others have shared with them. In online interaction 
we saw how people make use of certain features of the systems they use to render other people 
accountable for what is then done with their data, typically by targeting or filtering recipients in 
various ways. 
Now the point we reached in the previous section would seem to indicate that there are serious 
issues confronting the design of digital systems with regard to how they handle the sharing of 
personal data. However, as the outline just presented should make clear, a great deal of this paper 
has actually been concerned with articulating how people are already sharing personal data, and the 
methods they are using to accomplish that. So it is evidently not the case that digital systems are 
entirely obstructive to the sharing of personal data. Indeed, this would be a hard claim to make in 
the face of the countless millions of successful digitally-mediated interactions that happen every 
day.  
The fact that people somehow accomplish the sharing of personal data in the digital world, and 
that they are somehow evolving a body of practice whereby they can accomplish sharing as ongoing 
matter, is not reason to be complacent or to assume that digital systems are already good enough 
and that it is simply a matter of time before people come up to speed. For all that people evidently 
make do with what the digital provides them, it is evident too that the digital world is routinely 
encountered as a ‘troublesome’ place that breaches the calculus of accountability governing the 
practical politics of sharing.  
As this study makes clear, in the real world, in face to face encounters, data sharing is ‘recipient 
designed’ – i.e., crafted in specific places, at specific times, in specific ways, for specific people. 
Furthermore, the interactional design of moments of personal data sharing is necessarily an 
‘occasioned’ (whether incidentally or purposefully) and a morally ordered matter that constrains the 
onward sharing of data. The rapid dispersal of data, and the potential for new technology to 
concomitantly render people accountable for matters that might ordinarily be expected to remain 
out of view, routinely enables the digital to breach the moral order, thereby disrupting the calculus 
of accountability governing the practical politics of sharing. Core to the disruption is that digital 
systems derail the case-by-case interactional crafting and shaping which is at the core of the practical 
politics of sharing, and instead oblige people to engage in generic rather than situated practices of 
action and reasoning to manage the sharing of personal data in the digital world.  
Nonetheless, our study has shown something of how people routinely manage this disruption 
and bootstrap the breach. It taps into and allows us to witness elements of an evolving online calculus 
of accountability geared towards governing sharing in circumstances where parties to the occasion 
are not co-present and are potentially unknown. In such commonplace circumstances in the digital 
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world it is impossible for people to control what other recipients might make of their data, and even 
who the recipients are or might be. We thus see people taking great care over the management of 
cohorts, identities, and the visibility of the digital self to reduce the chance of sharing personal data 
with people they would not ordinarily wish to share it with.  
Time and again the reasoning driving this evolving body of practice is articulated in our studies 
in terms of avoiding real world accountability for the things people share online. This is not, we 
note, a concern to dispense with accountability entirely, but rather to manage just who it is persons 
might be accountable to and in what ways. Thus, the evolving calculus governing data sharing in 
the digital world seeks to constrain the accountability of persons and their digitally-mediated 
interactions. This is a particular challenge in a world where what constitutes personal data is being 
reimagined on the fly by technological platforms.  
Manifold elements of the digital footprint automatically harvested by digital systems further 
disrupt the moral order when they are eventually surfaced and become apparent. People are trying 
to handle this intrusion (the rise of ad blockers, for example, is pronounced), but more is needed and 
design should not then rest on its laurels and leave people to work around the troubles that 
accompany data sharing in the digital world. Rather, design should seek to support the calculus of 
accountability that provides for data sharing in the real world, and it should do so not as a matter of 
moral compunction but because it will gear the digital into the practical politics of sharing and thus 
enable rather than disrupt personal data sharing. 
Key to this achievement is to recognise that there is more to the sharing of personal data than 
data. Clearly, it will be important to articulate what data is being shared, especially with respect to 
underlying and evolving technological platforms, and this is clearly starting to happen, e.g., through 
new data protection regulations and a growing interest in making algorithms accountable. However, 
it is equally important to transcend generic mechanisms and support the haecceities of data sharing 
to enable people to manage just where, just when, and just who gets access to their data and to 
determine just what of it gets used and just what it gets used for by whom, whether incidentally or 
purposefully, on a case-by-case basis in the ongoing course of digitally-mediated interaction.  
In talking of the haecceities of data sharing we are not talking of enhanced privacy settings that 
provide a more extensive range of generic pre-specified polices, but of making a massively 
distributed environment of connected persons, things and black-boxed systems accountable to 
people and tractable in the moment of sharing. Thus design on this view needs to explore ways of 
providing support for the sharing of data that moves beyond gross pre-specification, as opposed to 
nuanced situated specificity. Providing more granularity, for instance by giving lots of sub-cohort 
options, does not fix the fundamental problem of pre-specification because people do not know in 
advance what every instance of sharing will look like. Concomitantly design needs to provide 
transparency to users regarding what their data looks like to the system and what ‘politics’ might be 
applied to it. Thus systems need to account for what constitutes data and what they assume they can 
do with the data, including what is intended to be achieved by the parties to sharing in situated 
instances of sharing.   
The extent of these challenges should not be underestimated. As Harold Garfinkel reminds us, 
“A society’s members encounter and know the moral order as perceivedly normal courses of action 
– familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life known in common with others and with 
others taken for granted” [29: 35]. Digital systems today pervade everyday affairs, but do they 
really share this world of daily life known in common with others and gear in with perceivedly 
normal courses of action? To some extent, yes, but they ride roughshod over the practical politics 
of sharing at their own expense. Design may well benefit, then, by complementing a concern with 
privacy with a concern to build the calculus of accountability into an increasingly networked world. 
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